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"There is no magic in a name, nor in a claim; that the words preferred
by a patentee to define his invention apply literally to another's device
suggests, but does not prove, infringement. . . .
INTRODUCTION
Can a federal court of appeals overrule Supreme Court precedent?
Not overtly. But if nobody takes notice, a circuit court can undermine
Supreme Court precedent, vacating lower court decisions that rely on the
precedent and announcing in published opinions that a once robust
doctrine has somehow suddenly become archaic, disfavored, and rarely
applied. This is how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
caused an important Supreme Court patent law doctrine to vanish: the
reverse doctrine of equivalents, as announced by the Court in the 1898
case Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co. 2 Hence Westinghouse
represents forgotten precedent in a different sense than is conventionally
thought: the leading patent court in the nation has requested that we forget
this precedent, with the result that the case is receding from memory and
relevance, unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes.
In Westinghouse, the Supreme Court established that two steps are
t Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. Thank you to my research
assistant, Griffin Schindler. Thank you to the organizers of the Syracuse Law Review
Symposium on Forgotten Intellectual Property Cases, Shubha Ghosh, Zvi Rosen, and the staff
of the Syracuse Law Review. This paper benefitted from comments at the symposium by
Robert Brauneis, Amelia Rinehart, Brian Frye, Jessica Kiser, Professors Ghosh and Rosen,
and Bruce Boyden, a distant relative of George A. Boyden, whose innovative reverse air
pressure air brake was liberated by the reverse doctrine of equivalents as set forth in this paper.
1. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 246 F. 834, 838 (2d Cir.
1917) (citing Edison v. Am. Mutoscope & Biograph Co., 151 F. 767, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1907)).
2. 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
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necessary to determine if an accused product infringes a patent.3 Yes, it
is first necessary to analyze whether an accused product falls within the
literal language of the patent claims.4 But even if it does, infringement is
not proven if the accused infringer has so far changed the principle of the
patented invention as to create a new, substantially superior innovation
that solves the problem in the prior art in a way the patented invention
failed to do. The Court in Westinghouse ruled that just as "a charge of
infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the claims be
avoided . .. [t]he converse is equally true."6 In other words, just as there
is an affirmative doctrine of equivalents to allow patent holders to
establish that an infringer really has appropriated a patented invention
despite avoiding the literal scope of the claims, so too there is a reverse
doctrine of equivalents to allow accused infringers to establish that the
patented invention has not been appropriated despite the fact that the
claim language semantically reads on the accused device.' In 1950 the
Supreme Court referred to the "wholesale realism" of this doctrine,
because it prevents patent infringement from being reduced to a
mechanical, linguistic exercise that fails to probe the substance of the
patent infringement question.8
For nearly one hundred years following Westinghouse, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents was a necessary safety valve in patent law to
ensure that granting the patent monopoly did not impede the "progress"
sought by the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.9 In cases
where the accused product represents a leap forward in the technology far
beyond what is disclosed in the asserted patent, society benefits from
access to that superior innovation unimpeded and untaxed by the asserted
patent. There are over thirty published opinions finding or affirming
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents between 1898
and the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit and uncounted additional
3. Id. at 568.
4. See id. at 568.
5. See id. at 572-73.
6. Id. at 568 (citing Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 121 (1877)).
7. See generally Charles F. Pigott, Jr., Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
291 (1966) (discussing the reverse doctrine of equivalents). Although the doctrine was
regularly applied to excuse infringement in the decades between 1898 and the 1982 creation
of the Federal Circuit, the term "reverse doctrine of equivalents" was not used prior to Pigott's
article, which perhaps partially explains why precedent applying the doctrine has been
forgotten, even by the Federal Circuit. See Samuel F. Ernst, The Lost Precedent ofthe Reverse
Doctrine ofEquivalents, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 467, 472 (2016).
8. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-11 (1950)
(citing Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898)).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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unpublished dispositions as well as opinions denying or vacating
summary judgment of infringement due to a dispute of fact regarding
reverse equivalency.' 0 In at least the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, and indeed as stated by the Supreme Court itself in
Westinghouse, reverse equivalency always had to be considered as part
of the principal infringement case."
The reverse doctrine of equivalents enjoyed steady application by
the courts in the decades since the 1898 Westinghouse case until the
1980s, when the Federal Circuit was created and proceeded to stamp out
the doctrine.1 2 In the 1980s the Federal Circuit regularly vacated or
reversed findings of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents to the point where such findings of noninfringement have
disappeared altogether.' 3 In 2002 the Federal Circuit proclaimed final
victory over the reverse doctrine of equivalents, mischaracterizing it as
an "anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied ....
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit warned the lower courts that "this court
has never affirmed a finding of noninfringement under the reverse
doctrine of equivalents."" And it likely never will, unless an intrepid
petitioner for certiorari someday convinces the Supreme Court to revive
the doctrine.
I. WESTINGHOUSE AND ITS PROGENY
The history of the development of air pressure brakes for trains in
the late nineteenth century is yet another case study to debunk what Mark
Lemley referred to as "the myth of the sole inventor."' 6 Rather than a lone
genius solving all of the problems attendant with such technology in a
flash, multiple parties worked on the technology simultaneously, each
10. See generally The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note
7 (cataloguing cases finding or affirming noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents).
11. See Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 383 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1967); Skirow v.
Roberts Colonial House, Inc., 361 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1966) (citing N. Star Ice Equip. Co.
v. Akshun Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 1962)); Craftint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d
368, 373 (9th Cir. 1938) (first citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568; and then citing Cimiotti
Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Ref Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1905)); Morgan Constr. Co. v.
Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 223 (2d Cir. 1921) (citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
12. See infra Section I.
13. See infra Section II.
14. Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
15. Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368).
16. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709, 710
(2012).
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contributing incremental improvements to gradually improve the
mechanism. 1 Or as the Supreme Court described the development of this
technology,
The history of arresting the speed of railway trains by the application
of compressed air is one to which the records of the Patent Office bear
frequent witness, of a gradual progress from rude and imperfect
beginnings, step by step, to a final consummation, which, in respect to
this invention, had not been reached when the patent in suit was taken
out, and which, it is quite possible, has not been reached to this day.18
The basic operation of railway air brakes as developed in the late
nineteenth century was as follows: an air pump on the engine of the train
created and stored a large reservoir of compressed air.19 A pipe leading
from the engine all along the underside of the cars of the train allowed
for the release of the compressed air to trigger a brake cylinder on each
car, thereby braking the train.20 The problem with this system as
originally conceived was that because the compressed air had to travel all
along the length of the train through the train pipe to brake each car, the
train carriages did not brake simultaneously with the engine or with one
another.2 1
This loss proved to be about 1 second per car; so that on a passenger
train of 10 cars the time necessary for the pressure to reach the rear car
would be 10 seconds; and on a freight train of 50 cars would be nearly
a minute. Thus, while for [sic] forward movement of the foremost cars
would be checked at once, that of the rearmost cars would not be as
promptly checked, and these would come against the cars in front of
them with more or less shock, producing more or less discomfort or
positive damage. This defect will be appreciated when it is remembered
that a train moving at the rate of 45 miles an hour moves 66 feet per
second; so that a freight train of 50 cars would run more than half a mile
before the brakes could begin to be effective along the entire train.22
17. Id. at 710-11 ("Invention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual,
phenomenon. Inventors build on the work of those who came before, and new ideas are often
either 'in the air' or result from changes in market demand or the availability of new or
cheaper starting materials."). For a complete history of innovation in the development of the
railroads and its relation to the patent system, the author commends to the reader Steven W.
Usselman's excellent book, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BusINEss, TECHNOLOGY,
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 97-176 (2002).
18. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 545 (1898).
19. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 70 F. 816, 818 (4th Cir.
1895).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 70 F. at 818.
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The Supreme Court in Westinghouse examines in excruciating detail
the small, incremental steps various researchers took to attempt to solve
this problem, each step attended by its own United States patent.23 Hence,
one patent disclosed the installation of auxiliary reservoirs under each
car, with each auxiliary reservoir charged with compressed air to brake
each car rather than drawing air directly from the main pipe. 24 Then,
numerous patents were granted on various types of valves to govern the
feeding of air from the train pipe to the auxiliary reservoirs and from the
auxiliary reservoirs to the brake cylinders, from poppet valves to piston
valves to slide valves. 25 Next, it was discovered that venting the train pipe
at the locomotive and under each car quickened the application of the
brakes. 26 A large leap forward came with the invention of the automatic
brake, which operated not by the application of compressed air to the
brake cylinders, but by the reverse action of the escape of air from the
auxiliary reservoirs.27
While these improvements allowed for the use of air pressure brakes
in shorter, passenger trains, still the problem in the prior art persisted:
"[I]t was found, in practice upon long freight trains, that the air from the
auxiliary reservoirs did not act with sufficient promptness upon the
brakes of the rear cars, where a particularly speedy action was
required ... ."28 To address this problem, George Westinghouse, Jr.
invented the patent-in-suit in Westinghouse, U.S. Patent No. 360,070.29
The Westinghouse patent introduced a triple-valve mechanism under
each car, which connected the train pipe, the auxiliary reservoir, and the
brake cylinder.30 While the train was running, the auxiliary reservoirs
were fully charged with air.31 But when the engineer applied the brakes,
it resulted in a reduction of air pressure in the train pipe, which opened a
passage in each triple-valve for the discharge of compressed air from the
auxiliary reservoir and the train pipe to the brake cylinder.32
Westinghouse claimed his invention as having the following limitations:
23. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1898).
24. Id. at 548-49 (citing U.S. Patent No. 124,404 (filed Mar. 5, 1872)).
25. Id. at 549 (first citing U.S. Patent No. 141,685 (filed Aug. 12, 1873); then citing U.S.
Patent No. 144,006 (filed Oct. 28, 1873); then citing U.S. Patent No. 163,242 (filed May 11,
1875); and then citing U.S. Patent No. 168,359 (filed Oct. 5, 1875)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 547-48 (first citing '685 Patent; and then citing U.S. Patent No. 220,556 (filed
Oct. 14, 1879)).
28. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 550.
29. Id. at 537 (citing U.S. Patent No. 360,070 (filed Mar. 29, 1887)).
30. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 70 F. 816, 818 (1895).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 818-19.
2018] 57
Syracuse Law Review
In a brake mechanism, the combination of a main air-pipe, an
auxiliary reservoir, a brake-cylinder, and a triple valve having a piston
whose preliminary traverse admits air from the auxiliary reservoir to the
brake-cylinder, and which by a further traverse admits air directly from
the main air-pipe to the brake-cylinder, substantially as set forth."
There appears to have been only one problem with Westinghouse's
solution-it did not work.34 The Fourth Circuit noted, "[t]his device does
not seem to have proved effectual for the special purposes for which it
was designed, and [Westinghouse] improved it by a later one, patented to
him on July 24, 1888, numbered 376,837, which is not in suit.",3 The
Fourth Circuit wrote of Westinghouse's invention, "[i]t was found, on
thorough and conspicuous trials, to be imperfect and inefficient, and
lacked that essential element of patented devices, utility." 36 The Supreme
Court observed of the Westinghouse patent, "[t]his patent, although it
introduced a novel feature into the art, does not seem to have been entirely
successful in its practical operation .... "3 7 The Supreme Court refers to
"the fact that the invention in this case was never put into successful
operation. . . ."38 In short, although Westinghouse was granted a patent,
he did not provide a solution to the problem in the prior art, and society
did not receive the "Progress" in exchange for his patent that the
Constitution would anticipate.
The accused infringer, Boyden Power Brake Company, did provide
a solution to the problem with compressed air brakes. 3 9 Boyden used all
of the limitations of Westinghouse's invention: The main air pipe, the
auxiliary reservoir, the brake cylinder, and the triple-valve. 40 But Boyden
introduced a new element:
He inserted a partition in the form of a brass ring into the triple valve ...
between the chamber containing the valves and the compressed air of
the auxiliary reservoir on one hand and the chamber of the piston
containing train pipe air on the other, and he opened a port in that
partition for the passage of compressed air from the train pipe to the
brake cylinder .... Boyden [thereby] contrived to discharge both train
pipe air and auxiliary reservoir air simultaneously into the brake
33. U.S. Patent No. 360,070, at [4] cl. 2 (filed Mar. 29, 1887).
34. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 70 F. at 817.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 823.
37. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 552 (1898).
38. Id. at 562.
39. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 70 F. at 823.
40. Id. at 826.
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cylinder without using an additional stem or valve or by-passages. 41
This mechanism created a condition whereby when the engineer
pulled the brake there was extreme air pressure on the side of the train
pipe and minimal air pressure in the auxiliary chamber.4 2 Hence, the valve
is instantly forced open by the greater train-pipe pressure, which then
vents freely through the said feed valve-port into the main valve-
chamber ... where it commingles with the auxiliary reservoir air
passing through said chamber, and both airs pass together through the
port opened by the main valve . .. of the brake-cylinder. 43
Through this contrivance the accused train braking mechanism
achieved unexpected successful results and finally solved the problem in
the prior art:
The whole operation is substantially instantaneous, and the result is that
the train-pipe is freely vented at each car, the time of serially or
successively applying the brakes of the several cars from one end of the
train to the other is reduced to a minimum, and the train is quickly
stopped without shock, a result which Mr. Westinghouse did not attain
with the device of patent No. 360,070.. 4
In analyzing whether the accused Boyden system infringed the
Westinghouse patent, the Supreme Court first determined that there was
literal infringement-that the Boyden device contained each of the
limitations of the Westinghouse claims:
In both complainants' and defendants' devices there is (1) a feeding-
in valve to charge the auxiliary reservoir; (2) a valve which
complainants call their "main valve," and which the defendants
denominate a "graduating valve," which is opened by the preliminary
traverse of the piston to admit reservoir air to the brake-cylinder; (3) a
release valve which discharges air from the brake-cylinder to the
atmosphere; and (4) a quick-action valve ... which is opened by the
further traverse of the piston to admit train-pipe air to the brake-
cylinder.45
There appeared to be literal infringement of at least claims one and
four of the Westinghouse patent.4 6
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that a finding of literal
41. Id. at 823-24.
42. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 570 (1898).
43. Id. at 570-71.
44. Id. at 571.
45. Id. at 565.
46. Id. at 568.
592018]
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infringement was not the end of the liability analysis.47 The Court held
that in order to find liability, there must also be "substantial identity"
between the claimed invention and the accused device-that the two are
"equivalent" in substance. 48 The Court wrote,
But even if it be conceded that the Boyden device corresponds with
the letter of the Westinghouse claims, that does not settle conclusively
the question of infringement. We have repeatedly held that a charge of
infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the claims be
avoided [i.e., the doctrine of equivalents]. The converse is equally true.
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but
if the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims
of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual
invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who
has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when he has done
nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.49
The Court held that "[a]n infringement ... involves substantial
identity, whether that identity be described by the terms, 'same principle,'
same 'modus operandi,' or any other."o
The Court then proceeded to analyze whether the Boyden device
was substantially different from the Westinghouse claims, not only
technologically, but also whether it was practically and commercially
superior.5 1 Technologically, the Court ruled that the Boyden device
contained a "radical departure from the Westinghouse patent ... in the
partition ... separating the valve-chamber ... from the piston-
chamber."5 2 This partition resulted in the Boyden device operating in a
substantially different manner than the Westinghouse patent through "the
differential pressure theory" described above. 53 "In a word, this partition
maintains upon the outside of [the] valve ... a much higher pressure than
upon the inside, the effect of which is to open [the] feed-valve . .. and
admit a full volume of train-pipe air upon the brake-cylinder." 54 Although
both inventions had the function of engaging the brake cylinder through
air pressure, "The means used in accomplishing this function are so
different that we find it impossible to say, even in favor of a primary
47. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568 (citing Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1878)).
48. Id. (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 572-73 (1864)).
49. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Mach. Co., 97 U.S. at 126).
50. Id. (quoting Burr, 68 U.S. at 572-73).
51. Id. at 570-73.
52. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 570.
53. Id. at 572.
54. Id. at 571.
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patent, that they are mechanical equivalents." 5 Not only was the Boyden
system therefore technologically superior to the asserted patent, it was
also practically and commercially superior. The Court reasoned,
We are induced to look with more favor upon this device, not only
because it is a novel one and a manifest departure from the principle of
the Westinghouse patent, but because it solved at once in the simplest
manner the problem of quick action, whereas the Westinghouse patent
did not prove to be a success until certain additional members had been
incorporated into it.56
Accordingly, the Boyden braking system escaped infringement
under the reverse doctrine of equivalents and was made available for the
benefit of the public.
One might argue that the public would have benefited from
Boyden's innovation even if infringement had been found, because
Westinghouse could have appropriated Boyden's improvement.5 8 This is
incorrect, however, because Boyden's invention was also patented and
would have prevented such appropriation by Westinghouse. 59 Hence,
Westinghouse's patent and Boyden's patent were "blocking patents" in
relation to one another.60 And although it is often hypothesized that the
holders of blocking patents will have the incentive to negotiate a cross-
license, the truth is that this situation often ends up in contentious,
wasteful litigation, rather than an amicable cross-license.61 Westinghouse
is just one more example of the failure of the blocking patents hypothesis.
In order for the public to benefit from Boyden's innovation, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents was necessary to excuse literal infringement.
Hence was born the reverse doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme
Court reaffirmed the validity of this doctrine in dictum fifty years later in
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 62 In
affirming the continued viability of the affirmative doctrine of
equivalents, the Court also noted that the reverse doctrine of equivalents
was alive and well:
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572.
57. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 573 (holding that the Boyden device did not infringe
Westinghouse's patent).
58. See Samuel F. Ernst, Protecting the Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration in the
Patentee's Social Contract, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 40-41 (2015).
59. See U.S. Patent No. 481,135 (filed Aug. 16, 1892).
60. Compare id. (showing a design for a fluid pressure brake), with U.S. Patent No.
360,070 (filed Mar. 29, 1887) (showing a design for a fluid pressure automatic brake
mechanism).
61. See Protecting the Boundaries, supra note 58, at 41-42.
62. See 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citing Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1854)).
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The wholesale realism of this doctrine [of equivalents] is not always
applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus,
where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that
it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different
way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the
doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the
patentee's action for infringement. 63
In the meantime, the reverse doctrine of equivalents had been fully
embraced and developed by the lower courts,6 contrary to the Federal
Circuit's peculiar assertion that the doctrine is "one anachronistic
exception, long mentioned but rarely applied." 65 Because the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits developed a particularly robust
articulation of the doctrine, requiring reverse equivalents to be considered
as part of the prima facie infringement case, it is useful to analyze a few
of these cases in detail.6 6
In Mead Digital Systems, Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., the Sixth Circuit
confronted, inter alia, U.S. Patent No. 3,596,275 ("the Sweet Patent"),
which claims an apparatus for ink jet printing.6 7 In general terms, the
Sweet Patent disclosed a printer that controlled the trajectory of ink
droplets sprayed onto a deflection plate by maintaining a constant voltage
on the deflection plate and placing a variable voltage on the ink droplets. 68
The accused device was an ink jet printer produced by Mead called the
DIJIT printer. 69 The DIJIT printer also deflected droplets onto a recording
medium by charging the droplets and the recording medium, and the
Sixth Circuit found that the DIJIT printer "embodie[d] virtually all of the
principles and techniques" disclosed in the patents-in-suit.7 0 However,
63. Id. at 608-09 (citing Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568
(1898)).
64. See, e.g., Mead Digital Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 1983);
Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 382 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1967); Skirow v. Roberts Colonial
House, 361 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1966) (citing N. Star Ice Equip. Co. v. Akshun Mfg. Co.,
301 F.2d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 1962)); Craftint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir.
1938) (citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568); Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277
F. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1921) (quoting Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
65. Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
66. See Mead Digital Sys., 723 F.2d at 462; Foster Cathead Co., 382 F.2d at 765; Skirow,
361 F.2d at 391 (citing N. Star Ice Equip. Co., 301 F.2d at 886); Craftint Mfg. Co., 94 F.2d at
373 (citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568); Morgan Constr. Co., 277 F. at 224 (quoting
Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
67. 723 F.2d at 458 (citing U.S. Patent No. 3,596,275 (filed July 27, 1971)).
68. Id. at 458.
69. Id. at 461.
70. Id.
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the court found that the accused DIJIT printer deflected droplets in a
substantially different way from the Sweet Patent. Whereas the patented
invention used many different charge levels to direct droplets onto many
different locations on the recording medium, the DIJIT printer employed
the elegant solution of using only two charge levels: one charge level of
one hundred volts deflected droplets onto a catcher, such that they did not
reach the recording medium; a second charge level of zero volts permitted
the droplets to travel undeflected onto the recording medium.72 The DIJIT
printer then accomplished the task of directing the droplets to precise
locations on the recording medium by adding sophisticated technology
that was not disclosed in the asserted Sweet Patent: "Those concepts
include the coordination of multiple jets, interception for creating an
apparent discontinuity in the image, and a charging and deflection system
whereby the final picture is not characteristic of the charging signals."73
By contrast, "The Sweet [P]atent does not contemplate a high speed
character printer with coordinated multiple jets and a deflection system
whereby all charged droplets are deflected into a collector and uncharged
droplets are deposited on the recording medium to form the desired
characters." 74 The court found that "[t]he DIJIT printer, quite simply, is
a more sophisticated device . . . ."7 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court in concluding that although the DIJIT printer
fell within the literal scope of the Sweet Patent's claims, it escaped
infringement through the "application of the doctrine of equivalents."7 6
The DIJT printer was "a significant advance" and was simply not the
equivalent of the inventions disclosed in the Sweet Patent. 7
The patent holder argued that once the court determined that the
accused device fell within the literal scope of the claims, that was the end
of the matter; infringement was proven. The Sixth Circuit rejected this
contention, calling it the "so-called doctrine of literal infringement,"
which "continues to live in the cases despite repeated pronouncements
that infringement is not a mere matter of words." 79 Although the Supreme
Court said in Graver Tank that "[i]f accused matter falls clearly within
71. See id.
72. Mead Dig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 461.
73. Id. at 464.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Mead Dig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 464.
78. Id. at 462 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
607 (1950)).
79. Id. (citing 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (1983)).
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the claim, infringement is made out and that is the end of it," the Sixth
Circuit pointed out that "two paragraphs after announcing that doctrine
the Court recognizes that the doctrine of equivalents applies even when
the accused device falls within the literal words of the claim."so The Sixth
Circuit lamented that
Courts, however, unfortunately continue to pay lip service to the
doctrine of literal infringement as though it were the rule ... . Perhaps
we are embarrassed to expose the 'wholesale realism' which controls
many infringement cases, and we choose instead to present the facade
of precision and certainty which attends the doctrine of literal
infringement.8 1
The rule in the Sixth Circuit, however, was that a finding of literal
infringement was not the end of the story.82 The court had to consider
whether the accused device was materially the same as the patented
invention or if it departed substantially from the principle of the
invention.8 3 Because the accused DIJIT printer was a far more
sophisticated device that relied on different principles than the Sweet
Patent, it avoided infringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents.84 The court acknowledged that "[t]his result will not set well
with those who demand rules in this area and treat patent law problems
as questions of semantics."85 But the reverse doctrine of equivalents was
necessary because "unsparing logic must be tempered with wholesale
realism." 86 Accordingly, the public received the benefit of the more
sophisticated DIJIT printer unimpeded and untaxed by a patent that failed
to disclose a modem, operable printer.
The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits also fully embraced
the reverse doctrine of equivalents prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit.8 7 In all of these circuits, a finding of literal infringement was not
80. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-09; Mead Dig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 464.
81. Mead Dig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 462 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608).
82. Id. at 463.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 464.
85. Id. at 463.
86. Mead Dig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 463 (citing Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948)).
87. See Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 383 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1967); Skirow v.
Roberts Colonial House, Inc., 361 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1966) (citing N. Star Ice Equip. Co.
v. Akshun Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 1962)); Craftint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d
368, 373 (9th Cir. 1938) (first citing Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S.
537, 568 (1898); and then citing Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399,
406-07 (1905)); Morgan Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 223 (2d Cir. 1921)
(citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
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the end of the liability analysis.8 8
In Morgan Construction Co. v. Donner Steel Co., the Second Circuit
reversed a finding of infringement despite the fact that the claims were
literally infringed.89 The court cited to Westinghouse to articulate the law
as follows:
"Of the [patent] claims quoted, the first will undoubtedly, if read
literally, cover defendant's device; but this is not final. It remains to
inquire whether the alleged infringement displays 'substantial identity'
with the thing invented." 90
The Ninth Circuit cited Westinghouse to articulate this same
infringement analysis in Craftint Manufacturing Co. v. Baker:
The fact that the claims of appellees' patent are broad enough to cover
the appellant's process and medium paper does not establish
infringement. To infringe there must be identity of process or
combinations of materials used with those described in the patent or
their equivalents. Similarity of result is not sufficient .... 91
The Fifth Circuit stated that this mode of infringement analysis was
well settled in Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha:
It is well settled that merely because the claims in suit taken literally
read element by element on the accused device does not establish
infringement, nor does it establish a presumption of infringement. The
patentee in order to prove infringement has the burden of showing that
the accused structure is the equivalent of the particular embodiment of
the claimed structure disclosed in the specification and drawings. 92
So too the Seventh Circuit held in 1966, "Neither a literal application
of claim phraseology nor similarity of result is sufficient to establish
infringement. There must be a real identity of means, operation, and
result." 93
What is striking about these decisions is that the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is not an affirmative defense to be alleged by the defendant,
as the Federal Circuit has ruled.94 Rather, proving infringement requires
88. See Foster Cathead Co., 383 F.2d at 765; Skirow, 361 F.2d at 391; Craftint Mfg. Co.,
94 F.2d at 373; Morgan Constr. Co., 277 F. at 223.
89. See 277 F. at 224.
90. Id. (quoting Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 568).
91. Craftint Mfg. Co., 94 F.2d at 373 (citing Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537).
92. Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 382 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
93. Skirow, 361 F.2d at 391 (citing N. Star Ice Equip. Co. v. Akshun Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d
882, 886 (7th Cir. 1962)).
94. See.SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("When a patentee establishes literal infringement, the accused infringer may undertake
the burden of going forward to establish the fact of non-infringement under the reverse
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a showing of "substantial identity" in addition to literal infringement."
In other words, the question of patent infringement involves more
than a linguistic exercise of examining the words of a patent claim. Patent
infringement requires an analysis of the actual principle of the patented
invention and the substance of the technology accused, regardless of how
the patent holder has chosen to draft her claims. As the Second Circuit
put the matter in Linde Air Products Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair
Co., "There is no magic in a name, nor in a claim; that the words preferred
by a patentee to define his invention apply literally to another's device
suggests, but does not prove, infringement; there must be a substantial
identity, to justify that conclusion of law." 96
This was not a wild notion prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, but standard operating procedure. 9 7 Charles Pigott wrote in 1966
that "[i]t is well settled that merely because the claims in suit taken
literally read element by element on the accused device does not establish
infringement, nor does it establish a presumption of infringement. "98
Rather, the patentee also has the further burden of showing that the
accused product is "the equivalent" of the patented invention. 99 Hence,
the patent holder must make the same showing as it would with respect
to equivalent infringement, that the accused device performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially
the same result.100 Pigott writes, "[T]he patentee . . . must compare the
accused structure with the patented structure as disclosed in the
specification and drawings, and he must establish substantial identity of
means, operation, and result.""0 '
Hence, the reverse doctrine of equivalents addresses the problem
doctrine of equivalents.").
95. See The Lost Precedent ofthe Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note 7, at 482
("[T]here is a body of precedent standing for the proposition that reverse equivalents must
always be considered prior to finding infringement.") (emphasis added); see also John F.
Duffy, Counterproductive Notice in Literalistic Versus Peripheral Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1197, 1205 (2016) ("But under the traditional approach to peripheral claiming, the analysis in
Boyden Power Brake was not a defense; it was a required part of infringement analysis.")
(emphasis added).
96. 246 F. 834, 838 (2d. Cir. 1917) (citing Edison v. Am. Mutoscope & Biograph Co.,
151 F. 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1907)).
97. The Lost Precedent ofthe Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note 7, at 473 ("In
the years between 1898 . . . and the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit, the reverse doctrine
of equivalents was applied with some regularity (although not frequently) by the federal courts
to excuse literal infringement.").
98. Pigott, supra note 7, at 291-92 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 292.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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that Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have identified with claim
construction-"that courts define the scope of legal rights not by
reference to the invention but by reference to semantic debates over the
meaning of words chosen by lawyers."1 02 In the same vein, John Duffy
writes that the Federal Circuit's "literalistic claiming method deviates
sharply from the peripheral claiming method that was dominant
throughout most of the twentieth century."l 03 The reverse doctrine of
equivalents, like the nonliteralistic claiming method that these scholars
advocate for, allows the courts to "pay more attention to the patentee's
actual description of the invention and less to the words of the claims
themselves in deciding the patent's importance and coverage, thus
avoiding abuse of the litigation process by patentees who invent one thing
and later claim to own something else entirely." 0 4 More critically,
however, the reverse doctrine of equivalents allows the courts to take into
consideration the significance of the accused product in analyzing
infringement. 0 5 If the accused product is a greater innovation than the
invention claimed in the asserted patent, (substantially superior to the
patented invention in solving the problem in the prior art), then the court
can liberate the accused innovation from the snare of literal infringement
to the benefit of the public.1 0 6
The Federal Circuit was incorrect in concluding that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents was an "anachronistic exception, long mentioned
but rarely applied. . . ."'o' The doctrine was regularly (even if not
frequently) applied to excuse infringement between 1898 and 1988.108
This author has located multiple published opinions either finding or
affirming noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents in
the decades of that era: "Four opinions in the 1900s, two opinions in the
1910s, two opinions in the 1920s, eight opinions in the 1930s," two
opinions in the 1940s, three opinions in the 1960s, four opinions in the
102. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1746 (2009).
103. Duffy, supra note 95, at 1197. Although Burk and Lemley argue that the problems
associated with literalistic claiming emerged with the peripheral claiming system of the 1870s,
Duffy clarifies that peripheral claiming actually allowed for probing into the essence of the
invention because the patentee did not necessarily have rights to everything within the literal
bounds of the claim. Rather, it was the Federal Circuit's method of literalistic claim
construction that arose in the 1980s that divorced claim construction from the true essence of
the invention. Id. at 1202-03; Burk & Lemley, supra note 102, at 1748-49.
104. Burk & Lemley, supra note 102, at 1747.
105. See Pigott, supra note 7, at 296.
106. See id. at 295-96.
107. Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
108. The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note 7, at 476-77.
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1970s, and seven opinions in the 1980s.109 Hence, the doctrine was not
applied frequently; it was reserved to excuse infringement by substantial
innovations.110 But it was a regular mainstay of the infringement analysis,
and a critical component of the patent laws to safeguard the quid pro quo
109. The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 7, at 477-78
(first citing Severy Process Co. v. Harper & Bros., 113 F. 581, 584-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); then
citing Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 126 F. 639, 649 (6th Cir.
1903); then citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 171 F. 666, 669 (D. N.J. 1909); then
citing Duncan v. Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co., 171 F. 656, 665-66 (6th Cir. 1909); then
citing Am. Stoker Co. v. Underfeed Stoker Co. of Am., 182 F. 642, 653 (W.D. Pa. 1910); then
citing Borland v. N. Tr. Safe Deposit Co., 212 F. 178, 184 (N.D. Ill. 1914); then citing Morgan
Constr. Co. v. Donner Steel Co., 277 F. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1921); then citing Cadwell v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 13 F.2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); then citing Baker Perkins
Co. v. Thomas Roulston, Inc., 52 F.2d 799, 801 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); then citing Cinema Patents
Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 55 F.2d 948, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); then citing Esnault-
Pelterie v. Chance Bought Corp., 56 F.2d 393, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); then citing T.H.
Symington & Son, Inc. v. Symington Co., 9 F. Supp. 699, 708 (D. Md. 1935); then citing
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Amperex Elec. Prods., 15 F. Supp. 438, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); then citing
Radio Corp. of Am. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 16 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1936);
then citing Craftint Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 94 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1938); then citing British
Acoustic Films, Ltd. v. Elec. Research Prods., 29 F. Supp. 531, 535-36 (D. Del. 1939); then
citing Meikle v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 44 F. Supp. 460, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1942); then
citing Wheeling Stamping Co. v. Standard Cap & Molding Co., 60 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Md.
1945); then citing Nickerson v. Bearfoot Sole Co., 311 F.2d 858, 881 (6th Cir. 1963); then
citing Skirow v. Roberts Colonial House, Inc., 361 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1966); then citing
Foster Cathead Co. v. Hasha, 382 F.2d 761, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1967); then citing Marvin Glass
Co. & Assocs. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff d 448
F.2d 60, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1971); then citing Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340
F. Supp. 55, 70 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff d 506 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1972); then citing Leesona
Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1976); then citing Harris v. NRM Co., No.
C72-1310, 1976 U.S Dist. LEXIS 15049, at *11 (N.D. Ohio June 10, 1976); then citing Foster
Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 512 F. Supp. 792, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); then
citing Mead Dig. Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 462-64 (6th Cir. 1983); then
citing SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 591 F. Supp. 464, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); then citing Brenner v. Recognition
Equip. Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); then citing Technicon Instruments
Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 664 F. Supp. 1558, 1575 (D. Or. 1986), affd 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS
17092, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 1987); then citing Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
Labs. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Tex. 1987), rev'd, 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir.
1988); and then citing Precision Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Jetstream Sys. Co., 693 F. Supp.
814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
110. The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 7, at 478
(citing Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc., 662 F. Supp. at 628, rev'd, 859 F.2d at 890 ("Thus,
hemoglobin does not operate in a substantially different way from the compounds claimed-
which include hemoglobin-and we reject Helena's argument based on the reverse doctrine
of equivalents.")); SRIInt'l, 591 F. Supp. 464,471 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 775 F.2d at 1122-
23 (vacating summary judgment of noninfringement under the reverse DOE and remanding
for trial because there was a genuine issue of material face as to whether the item performed
in substantially the same way); see, e.g., MeadDig. Sys., 723 F.2d at 462-64; Precision Metal
Fabricators, Inc., 693 F. Supp. at 819; Technicon Instruments Corp., 664 F. Supp. at 1575,
aff d, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 17092, at*1; Brenner, 593 F. Supp. at 1278; Foster Wheeler
Corp., 512 F. Supp. at 801-02.
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of the patent system.'11 Moreover, the number of published opinions cited
above finding or affirming noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents does not include unpublished dispositions or opinions
denying or vacating summary judgment of infringement due to a dispute
of fact with respect to reverse equivalency.1 12 In short, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents was an essential safety valve in the infringement
analysis prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, which safeguarded
dozens of important innovations from the patent monopoly.1 1 3
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DISPOSAL OF WESTINGHOUSE
It seems odd to conceive of a court that favors one class of litigants
over another, but the evidence is undisputable that the Federal Circuit was
created to develop the law in favor of patent holders. In her article on the
origins of the Federal Circuit, Judge Marion T. Bennett describes a period
of economic malaise in the late 1970s in which it was felt that
"technological innovation was being impeded by the lack of uniformity
in application of the patent laws." 1 4 More than a lack of uniformity,
however, it was felt that the regional circuit courts were affirmatively
hostile to patent rights, according to Judge Bennett:
Still another factor entered the picture to diminish the patent system
further as an incentive to industrial innovation. Some of the regional
circuit courts, expressing strong feelings about the dangers of monopoly
and having a low regard for the expertise of the Patent Office, tended
not to give any deference to the administrative examination process and
invalidated many patents. It thus became important to make sure, where
possible, that a patent suit be brought in the least hospitable forum. 115
It was against this backdrop that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was created in 1982.6
Given that the origins of the court were grounded not only in a desire
to seek uniformity in patent law, but to strengthen patent rights, it is not
111. The Lost Precedent ofthe Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note 7, at 488.
112. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis v. Idexx Labs., 973 F. Supp. 24, 28 (D. Me.
1997); Union Carbide Corp. v. Tarancon Corp., 682 F. Supp. 535, 541-42 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
113. The Lost Precedent ofthe Reverse Doctrine ofEquivalents, supra note 7, at 505-06.
"[T]he reverse doctrine of equivalents would ideally 'serve as a judicial "safety valve,"
releasing pressure that builds up when pioneers and improvers fail to agree to a license."' Id.
at 497 (quoting Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case ofBlocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 75 (1994)).
114. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-
Origins, in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY:
1990-2002 3, 10 (2002).
115. Id.at1l.
116. Id. at 15.
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surprising that some of the early judges on the court felt this to be a
peculiar aspect of their judicial mission.l17 One of the Federal Circuit's
earliest reforms was to establish what the Sixth Circuit in Mead Digital
Systems called the "doctrine of literal infringement"; " the notion that
once a court determines that an accused product falls within the literal
scope of the claim language, the infringement analysis is concluded and
liability is established.1 1 9 A barrier to this doctrine is, of course, the
reverse doctrine of equivalents, because, as described above, it requires
proof of "substantial identity" in addition to literal infringement. And so
the reverse doctrine of equivalents had to go. But because it was
enshrined in a Supreme Court case, it could not be overruled by the
Federal Circuit directly.
The Federal Circuit began by consistently vacating or reversing
district court findings of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents.12 0 In SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corporation
of America, the en banc Federal Circuit decided that the question of
reverse equivalency was no longer part of the affirmative infringement
case, but rather, an affirmative defense to be asserted by the accused
infringer.' 2 ' "When a patentee establishes literal infringement, the
accused infringer may undertake the burden of going forward to establish
the fact of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents."122
This makes the case more difficult for the accused infringer, who now
bears the burden of showing reverse equivalency.' 23 The plaintiff can rest
its case on a showing of literal (or semantic) infringement and no longer
bears the burden of showing "substantial identity," as had been the case
for the prior one hundred years. Hence, "substantial identity" would no
longer be considered in every case and the "doctrine of literal
infringement" was established.1 2 4
117. See Pauline Newman, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, After Three
Decades, 23 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 553, 555 (2013) ("The proposal to
reorganize the federal judicial structure arose not from abstraction or ideology, but from the
practical urgency of recovering the incentive that can be provided by an effective patent
system.").
118. 723 F.2d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 662 F. Supp. 622, 628
(E.D. Tex. 1987), rev'd, 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec.
Corp. of Am., 591 F. Supp. 464, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd 775 F.2d 1107, 1122-23 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc).
121. 775 F.2dat 1123-24.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1176 (Fed.
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Moreover, the en banc court overruled a previous case to determine
that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was a question of fact, not an
equitable determination or a question of law.1 2 5 This ruling means that
the accused infringer cannot readily use the reverse doctrine of
equivalents as a tool to obtain summary judgment and thereby avoid the
settlement pressure and uncertainty presented by the specter of a trial.
The fact that reverse equivalency is a question of fact did not,
however, prevent the court from reversing a finding of noninfringement
under the reverse doctrine of equivalents in Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Helena Laboratories Corporation and, rather than remanding for
reconsideration, finding on appeal that the defense failed.1 2 6 In a
peculiarly fact-like conclusion for a court of appeals to make, the Federal
Circuit found that the accused "hemoglobin does not operate in a
substantially different way from the compounds claimed-which include
hemoglobin-and we reject Helena's argument based on the reverse
doctrine of equivalents." 2 7
The court further restricted the doctrine in Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
United States International Trade Commission by holding that it only
applies as a defense to literal infringement, not equivalent
infringement.1 2 8 The court held that "[t]he reverse doctrine of equivalents
comes into consideration only when literal infringement is apparent.
Since the . . . claims are not literally infringed, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents does not apply." 29 Hence, because the asserted patent was
found to be infringed by equivalents, no reverse equivalency defense
could be raised. 1 30 There is no rationale for restricting a doctrine intended
to protect substantial improvements from being used in cases where
infringement is only by equivalents. If the accused product does not even
fall within the literal scope of the claims, there is all the more reason to
consider whether it is a substantial improvement over the principle of the
Cir. 1993) (declining to consider the accused infringer's reverse doctrine of equivalents
defense because a party cannot raise a reverse doctrine of equivalent argument simply by
raising a defense to literal infringement or doctrine of equivalent infringement); Rolls-Royce
Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (declining to consider
reverse equivalency because the accused infringer did not raise it as an affirmative defense at
trial and finding the attack on the district court's failure to discuss reverse equivalency bold,
reckless, and improper).
125. SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at 1126 (overruling Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d
760 (Fed Cir. 1983)).
126. 662 F. Supp. 622,628 (E.D. Tex. 1987) rev'd, 859 F.2d 878, 889-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
127. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc., 859 F.2d at 890.
128. 846 F.2d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (opinion on denial of rehearing).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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patented invention. 13 1
Perhaps even more influential than these rulings rejecting reverse
equivalency in deterring district courts from relying on the doctrine has
been the Federal Circuit's hostile rhetoric in discussing the doctrine.1 32 In
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the
court called the doctrine "one anachronistic exception, long mentioned
but rarely applied.", 3 3 This is, of course, incorrect because the doctrine
was regularly applied throughout the twentieth century, as discussed
above. Nonetheless, the court not only rejected the defense in Tate Access
but found it necessary to point out that "[n]ot once has this court affirmed
a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents."134 The court repeated this admonition in Roche Palo Alto
LLC v. Apotex, Inc.: "The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely
applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of noninfringement
under the reverse doctrine of equivalents."' 35 Indeed, in Tate Access, the
court appears to make a prediction that it never will affirm a finding of
noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, stating, "Even
were this court likely ever to affirm a defense to literal infringement based
on the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the presence of one anachronistic
exception, long mentioned but rarely applied, is hardly reason to create
another." 3 6 Such statements can only be seen as warnings to the district
courts that findings of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents are not likely to survive on appeal.
The Federal Circuit's rationale for its hostility to the reverse doctrine
of equivalents is an argument that Congress implicitly overruled the
doctrine by passing 35 U.S.C. § 112 to provide for strict disclosure and
claim definiteness requirements:
Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement
based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason:
when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver
131. Take the example of an asserted hypothetical patent that contains claim limitations
A, B, and C. If the accused device contains elements A, B, and C that literally read on the
claim limitations, then the accused infringer may be able to argue noninfringement under the
reverse doctrine of equivalents (however unlikely it is that the defense will succeed). But
under Texas Instruments, if the accused product reads on limitations A and B literally, but
meets limitation C only by equivalents, the reverse doctrine of equivalents is not available as
a defense. This rule makes no sense.
132. See Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368).
136. Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368 (emphasis added).
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Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description, enablement,
definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with
the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. 137
The argument appears to be that the reverse doctrine of equivalents may
have been necessary prior to the enactment of § 112 because patent claims
were not necessarily definite in their scope and resort was had to the
patent specification to determine the true principle of the patented
invention.13 8 Now that patent claims are required to be clear and definite,
there is no need to inquire further into the principle of the invention once
the accused product is found to fall within the literal scope of the
claims. 139 The principle of the invention is what is set forth in the
claims.1 40
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents as classically articulated in Westinghouse and the precedent
discussed above was less focused on the scope of the patented invention
and more concerned with the nature and value of the accused
innovation. 14 1 The question was whether the accused product was
technically and practically superior to the patented invention, such that it
did not appropriate the true principle of the invention and, in equity,
should not be enjoined or taxed by the patent. This remains a relevant
inquiry after the passage of § 112 because there remains a need to protect
valuable innovations from the patent monopoly.
The second reason why the Federal Circuit's argument is incorrect
is that it has already been rejected by the Supreme Court. 4 2 In Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the petitioner asked the
.137. Id. (first citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952); and then citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
138. Id.; see Nathaniel Durrace, How the Doctrine of Equivalents May Save Claim
Construction, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 73, 74 (2005) ("[T]he court reasons that 35 U.S.C. § 112 and
its requirements are coextensive with the broadest possible reach of the [reverse doctrine of
equivalents], rendering it superfluous.").
139. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used "principle" and "equitable
scope of the claims" interchangeably following Tate Access. See Roche Palo Alto LLC, 531
F.3d at 1378 (explaining that the 'principle' or 'equitable scope of the claims' is established
by the same factors).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 572 (1898) ("We
are induced to look with more favor upon this device, not only because it is a novel one, and
a manifest departure from the principle of the Westinghouse patent, but because it solved at
once, in the simplest manner, the problem of quick action, whereas the Westinghouse patent
did not prove to be a success until certain additional members had been incorporated into it.").
142. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 (1997) (citing
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961)) ("In the context
of infringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent survived the passage of the
1952 Act.").
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Court to "speak the death" of the common law doctrine of equivalents. 14 3
The petitioner's "primary argument ... is that the doctrine of equivalents
as set out in Graver Tank in 1950, did not survive the 1952 revision of
the Patent Act . .. because . .. [the doctrine of equivalents] is inconsistent
with the statutory requirement that a patentee specifically 'claim' the
invention covered by a patent."'" The Supreme Court rejected this
argument because "[t]he 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from
the 1870 Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO."l4 5
The Court further reasoned that
[s]uch minor differences as exist between those provisions in the 1870
and the 1952 Acts have no bearing on the result reached in Graver Tank,
and thus provide no basis for our overruling it. In the context of
infringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent survived
the passage of the 1952 Act.' 46
And inAro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
the Court held that the 1952 Patent Act "left intact the entire body of case
law on direct infringement." 47 Hence, the 1952 Patent Act "left intact"
the Court's precedent on reverse equivalency as set forth in
Westinghouse. The Court makes clear in Graver Tank that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents is the same doctrine as the doctrine of equivalents,
but applied in favor of the accused infringer.14 8 Hence, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents was not overruled by the passage of § 112, and
the Federal Circuit is wrong to suggest otherwise.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents remains good law as a technical
matter. 14 9 But the Federal Circuit's rulings and pronouncements on the
issue have, as a practical matter, done away with the doctrine."s
Although the doctrine was regularly applied in every decade from the
143. Id. at 21. 1
144. Id. at 25 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952)).
145. Id. at 26.
146. Id. (citing Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 342).
147. Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 342.
148. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950)
("The wholesale realism of this doctrine [of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a
patentee but is sometimes used against him.").
149. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic SofamorDanek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("The Supreme Court has recognized ... [the reverse doctrine of equivalents] to be a
viable defense, even if it is rarely asserted.").
150. See Tate Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DuKE L.J. 1, 118 (2004) ("The Federal Circuit has never applied the doctrine [of
equivalents] to excuse infringement, and it recently criticized the defense.").
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1900s through the 1980s, it has never been applied since.1"' This author
has located zero published opinions applying the reverse doctrine of
equivalents to excuse literal infringement in the 1990s, zero such
opinions in the 2000s, and zero such opinions in the current decade. There
has not been a published opinion finding or affirming noninfringement
under the doctrine since the 1988 opinion of the Northern District of
California in Precision Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Jetstream Systems
Co. 152 Unless and until the en banc Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court
revives the doctrine, it is effectively overruled.
III. THE URGENT NEED FOR THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Whatever need there was to reform patent law in favor of patent
holders in the late 1970s, the pendulum has certainly now swung too far
in the opposite direction. Many scholars and commentators have noted
the growth of a "patent thicket"-a vast growth of low quality patents,
unpracticed by their owners, that serve as a tax on or downright barrier to
innovation.' 3 The majority of patents are never commercialized, 5 4 and
as Christopher Cotropia has observed, "Uncommercialized patents ...
fuel the use of patents as a litigation tool."'"' The annual cost of patent
litigation is staggering-one study concluded that accused infringers
spent approximately sixteen billion dollars per year in litigation costs to
defend against patent infringement claims by the late 1990s.15 6 Another
study found that patent troll litigation resulted in direct litigation costs for
defendants of twenty-nine billion dollars in 2011.' This does not include
the indirect costs of litigation, such as time spent by engineers and other
151. Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368 ("Not once has this court affirmed a decision
finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents."); see The Lost
Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 7, at 473, 477-78 ("After its
inception in 1982, the [Federal Circuit] began the practice of reversing or vacating district
court decisions finding noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents . . . in at
least two instances .... ).
152. 693 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
153. See, e.g., Amber Rose Stiles, Note, Hacking Through the Thicket: A Proposed Patent
Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology "Building Block" Patent Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL
L. REv. 555, 562 (2012); Stu Woolman, Elliott Fishman & Michael Fisher, Evidence ofPatent
Thickets in Complex Biopharmaceutical Technologies, 53 IDEA 1, 3 (2013); Amit Makker,
Note, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1163, 1175-76(2011).
154. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 362-64 (2010).
155. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly ofEarly Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
65, 112 (2009).
156. James E. Besson & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs ofPatent Litigation, 9 J.L.
EcoN. & POL'Y 59, 62 (2012).
157. James E. Besson & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 387, 408 (2014).
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employees to testify at depositions, gather and produce documents, assist
in developing and investigating defenses and design-arounds, and so
forth.158
Nor do these figures take into account the royalties paid to patent
holders to avoid litigation or the sheer cost of triaging and dealing with
licensing demand letters. 159 American companies are constantly beset
with letters from patent holders demanding royalties on successful
products:
Due to the increasing importance of patents and patent infringement
litigation, it has become a fact of life for technology companies that they
will receive multiple notice letters from patent-holders on a regular
basis. In the current environment, a major task for in-house counsel in
I.P. departments is to field these demand letters, make an assessment of
which demand letters are frivolous or intended for harassment, and
determine which raise valid infringement concerns. This work involves
complicated investigations into the accused technology, the proper
interpretation of the patent claims, and the existence of potentially
invalidating prior art.16o
Nor is there compelling evidence that the licensing demands result in any
additional innovation to benefit society. 16 1 Rather, "most demands simply
involve payment for the freedom to keep doing what the licensee was
already doing."l 6 2
As set forth in the Constitution, the patent system is intended to be
a quid pro quo-Congress is entitled to grant the patent monopoly in
return for "Progress."16 3 Surely this Progress does not merely encompass
the disclosure of abstract inventions that are never commercialized, but
are instead used as litigation tools.1 6 4 Rather, the Progress we should be
demanding in exchange for the patent monopoly should be innovations-
fully developed, market tested, successful machines and medicines that
158. The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, supra note 156, at 60.
159. The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 157, at 402-03, 405.
160. J. Timothy B. Dyk & Samuel F. Ernst, Patents, in 9 BusINESS & COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 775, 792 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2016).
161. Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REv. 137, 156-57 (2015).
162. Id.
163. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("Congress shall have Power to ... promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
164. See The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 157, at 388 (discussing how the
American patent system has experienced an explosion of litigation by nonpracticing entities-
those who do not practice the technology of their patents despite owning and asserting them).
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can be used by the public.' 65 Innovation is the result of far more than the
specification of an abstract invention: It requires the development of a
prototype, market testing, marketing, regulatory compliance, product
distribution, product improvements, and many other activities.166
Innovation is a "lengthy process" that is "fraught with uncertainty and
great expense."1 67 The patent system should be designed to encourage
this risky activity because it is innovation, not just invention, that benefits
the public. 168 And yet, the current patent system acts as a tax on
innovation.1 69 The empirical evidence suggests "that it is far from clear
that IP is doing the world more good than harm."1 70
This is not the first time in American history that we have seen a
patent thicket threatening to deter innovation. 171 Rather, in the 1800s,
there was an explosion of patents covering railroad technology.1 7 2 Steven
Usselman writes,
Throughout the antebellum period, railroading accounted for a
disproportionate share of patents. Year after year, the list of new patents
published in the annual report of the Commissioner of Patents contained
increasing numbers of devices under the headings "Civil Engineering
and Architecture" and "Land Conveyance." Most of them pertained to
railroads. In 1852, the Patent Office introduced a separate category for
inventions devised specifically for railroading. By the end of the Civil
War, the number of patents included in this classification had risen from
fifty to over 500 per year. Because railroads operated complex facilities
and performed a broad array of activities, moreover, they deployed
numerous other technologies listed under categories ranging from
paints, lubricants, and building materials to pumps, office machinery,
and electrical equipment.1 73
The result was a proliferation of patent litigation against the
railroads, similar to what we see today with nonpracticing entities
targeting technology companies. 174 Usselman continues, "as consumers
of patented technologies railroads more frequently found themselves on
the defensive. The mounting array of patents constituted an expanding
165. Ernst, supra note 58 at 7.
166. Cotropia, supra note 155, at 89-93.
167. Sichelman, supra note 154, at 347-48.
168. Id. at 366-68.
169. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1339
(2015).
170. Id. at 1335.
171. USSELMAN, supra note 17, at 101.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 99-100.
174. See id. at 101; see also The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 157, at 388.
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minefield of potential lawsuits and financial liabilities."' 7 1 Indeed, the
patent litigation explosion of the 1800s was even bigger than the one we
are experiencing today.17 6 Christopher Beauchamp observes that in 1850,
New York City and Philadelphia alone had ten times more patent
litigation, per U.S. patent in force, than the entire United States in 2013.1
The response to this patent thicket in the 1800s was twofold. First,
as Beauchamp points out, there was a "shift of patent litigation from
common law to equity[,]" such that "patent contests in court were almost
all before judges, until jury proceedings returned in the 1980s and
1990s ... ., This shift to equity allowed for the rise of doctrines that
allowed judges to weigh the equities of the patent holder against those of
the accused infringer, rather than applying formalistic legal rules that
only considered the rights of the patent holder, "patent misuse,
inequitable conduct, and laches, as well as other essentially equitable
judge-made contributions such as the doctrine of equivalents . . . .""
Hand-in-hand with this concept, patents were once seen as policy tools to
encourage innovation for the good of society, not as absolute property
rights to be enforced without regard to policy concerns."so Since the
1980s, however, we have embraced a system where patents are treated as
largely unqualified property rights, the invasion of which results in legal
remedies without regard to the equities of the parties or the good of
innovation policy.
Rather than embracing prospective legislation to address the current
patent litigation explosion, we might look to the lesson of history to free
innovation from the patent thicket. Enter the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. Like George Boyden's air brake, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is the necessary pressure release valve in the patent system to
ensure that radical innovations are preserved from the tangle of the patent
thicket."' The reverse doctrine of equivalents allows the judge in a patent
case to investigate beyond the semantic game of literal infringement; to
weigh the equities to determine if the accused innovation is substantially
175. USSELMAN,supra note 17, at 101.
176. Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848,
851 (2016); see Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hous. L. REv. 325, 332-
34 (2012) (describing how railroads found themselves under attack by patent speculators).
177. Beauchamp, supra note 176, at 851.
178. Id. at 912-13.
179. Id. at 913.
180. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 Ariz. L.
Rev. 263, 305-06 (2016).
181. See Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers:
The Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 156
(2006).
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superior to the claimed invention and has solved the problems in the prior
art in a way that the patent holder failed to do. 1 8 2 Because the reverse
doctrine of equivalents as applied in Westinghouse involves a comparison
of the success of the accused product to any commercial embodiment of
the patented invention produced by the patentee, 18 3 the doctrine would be
particularly effective against patent trolls, who do not practice their
patents. Reviving the reverse doctrine of equivalents would be a patent
reform that would not pose the danger of upsetting the innovation
ecosystem in unpredictable ways, such as patent adherents argue that
prospective legislation might do. 1 84 Instead, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents can be applied on a case-by-case basis in a manner that does
equity in each individual case.'8 ' The doctrine is a proven commodity.
In the last century, the reverse doctrine of equivalents preserved
dozens of innovations for the benefit of the public--everything from train
brakes to dot matrix printers. 186 The regular application of the reverse
doctrine of equivalents did not appear to deter innovation, as this was a
century that saw the development of the personal computer, the airplane,
the automobile, the space rocket, the satellite, the submarine, antibiotics,
and the internet, all without interference from (and perhaps with a little
help from) the reverse doctrine of equivalents. It is time to unleash the
power of the reverse doctrine of equivalents once again.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has done the public a disservice by relegating
the reverse doctrine of equivalents to an "anachronistic exception." The
reverse doctrine of equivalents is the necessary counterpart to the doctrine
of equivalents, ensuring that the weighty question of patent infringement
is not reduced to a mere word game. We must not allow the case of
182. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (quoting Burr
v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 572-73 (1864)).
183. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 572 ("We are induced to look with more favor upon this
[accused] device, not only because it is a novel one and a manifest departure from the principle
of the Westinghouse patent, but because it solved at once in the simplest manner the problem
of quick action, whereas the Westinghouse patent did not prove to be a success until certain
additional members had been incorporated into it.").
184. See, e.g., Press Release, Biotechnology Indus. Org., BIO Opposes H.R. 9, The
Innovation Act (June 11, 2015), https://www.bio.org/media/press-release/bio-opposes-hr-9-
innovation-act.
185. See Chien, supra note 176, at 347-48 (arguing that broad, substantive legislative
proposals across the patent system did not solve the railroad patent thicket; rather, tailored
reforms in the courts and self-help were most effective).
186. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 545 (involving train brakes); Mead, 723 F.2d at 455
(involving printers).
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Westinghouse v. Boyden to become forgotten precedent because the rule
announced in that case is an important check on the patent system that
allows for the liberation from the patent thicket of important innovations.
The day must surely come when a brave petitioner for certiorari awakens
the Supreme Court from its slumber and points out that the Federal
Circuit has all but overruled critical Supreme Court precedent.
